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I consider the strategies that an opposition party can use against an
incumbent party which controls the government. The focus is on strate-
gies when citizens vote retrospectively (so that the incumbent’s chance
of winning re-election increases with his performance), and when citizens
compare the estimated abilities of the candidates. In both cases, the equi-
librium may have the opposition vote against all policies the government
proposes.
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11 Introduction
Most research on government looks at the behavior of the government, or of
the governing party—they are the organizations that set policy. But surely
the government’s actions may depend on what it expects the opposition to
do, and in turn the opposition’s behavior will depend on how it expects the
government to respond. In the following, I explore the opposition’s incentives.
I assume that the opposition cares only about increasing its chances of winning
the next election, and I will examine the conditions which induce the opposition
to oppose or support policies the incumbent (or government) proposes. Under
plausible conditions, the opposition will oppose all governmental policies, both
good and bad. The opposition may therefore provide no information either
to the government or to the public about the quality of policy. Evaluation of
governmental policy will then depend not on politicians, but on other groups,
such as on the media or on special interest groups.
2 Literature
In empirical work, McMillan and Zoido (2004) measure the importance of op-
position parties, the judiciary, and a free press by looking at the bribes paid
by the Peruvian secret-police chief Montesinos. They ﬁnd that Montesinos paid
a television channel owner about 100 times what he paid a judge or a politi-
cian, suggesting that the opposition little inﬂuences outcomes, or else that the
opposition can be bought cheaply.
My approach, which considers two political parties, relates to the analysis of
the “Not Invented Here” bias examined by Baliga and Sjostrom (2001). They
consider a ﬁrm in which one employee suggests a project, another employee
can evaluate it, and the manager must decide whether to adopt the project.
A successful project raises the inventor’s chance of promotion, at his peer’s
expense, but a failed project ruins the inventor’s career. In such a situation, the
employee who evaluates the project may be overly critical, and the employee
who proposed the project may be overly enthusiastic. This paper in turn builds
on Holmstrom (1982), who presented the ﬁrst analysis of relative performance
in a team.
2.1 Reputation
In section 3 below, I suppose that the opposition’s electoral success increases
with his reputation for correctly evaluating policy. The idea that a leader cares
about his reputation is old. Alexander Hamilton, wrote in Federalist Number
72 that “the love of fame is the ruling passion of the noblest minds.” The desire
for fame motivated America’s Founding Fathers to look beyond their narrow
self interest and to take actions to beneﬁt later generations (see Adair 1974).
How the quest for a favorable reputation aﬀects managerial decisions is stud-
ied by Scharfstein and Stein (1990); they show that concern about reputation
2induces herd-like behavior. Holmstrom (1999) analyzes how a person’s con-
cern for a future career inﬂuences his incentives to exert eﬀort. If output is
the sum of ability, eﬀort, and a random disturbance, increased eﬀort increases
the employer’s estimate of the worker’s ability, and so increases the employer’s
willingness to pay a high wage.
Reputational considerations bias a leader’s decisions in several ways. A
politician may increase his chances of winning election by pandering to the
public, taking actions the public may incorrectly believe are the better ones
(Tirole and Maskin (2001) and Smart and Sturm (2003)). If a project will
likely fail even under a skilled leader, a leader (whether skilled or not) may
prefer projects likely to fail over projects likely to succeed (Harbaugh (2002)
and Majumdar and Mukand (2004)). Indeed, a politician with a bad reputation
may favor a highly risky policy—if the policy fails, he would have lost the next
election anyway, but if the policy succeeds, his reputation and so his chances of
re-election improve. Hess and Orphanides (1995) apply this idea to claim that
a president with a bad reputation may risk war to give him an opportunity to
improve his reputation.
Reputational concerns can also lead an incumbent to take immediate ac-
tion when social welfare requires that he wait for further information (Gersbach
(2004)). And whether the results of a policy will become known before rather
than after the next election can aﬀect a leader’s incentives to innovate (Rose
Ackerman (1980)). A leader may avoid reversing a failed policy, because re-
versing a policy signals that the policy was bad in the ﬁrst place.1 Applying
the idea to politics, Beniers and Dur (2004) consider politicians who care about
reputation, and therefore will not reverse a policy that they, but not the voters,
know has failed. In Morris (2001), reputational concerns give rise to political
correctness: an adviser who does not wish to be thought of as biased (e.g., as a
racist), may not truthfully reveal his information.
I too consider how reputational considerations aﬀect the behavior of politi-
cians; like many of the papers mentioned above, I too suppose that oﬃcials are
uncertain about which policy is best. But I diﬀer in focusing on the opposition
rather than on the incumbent. In that focus, my approach relates to Grose-
close and McCarty (2001), who study how Congress may pass bills it expects
the president of the opposing party to veto, because a veto would reveal to
voters that the president’s ideology is extreme. That is, like me, Groseclose
and McCarty consider two parties with opposing interests, and consider how
their actions can reveal information to voters about the parties. But I diﬀer in
three ways: (1) I consider retrospective voting rather than only reputation; (2)
I consider competence rather than ideology; (3) I consider strategies when the
opposition can veto a policy the incumbent proposes.
1See Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut (1989), Boot (1992), Prendergast and Stole (1996),
Brandenburgem and Polak (1996), and Dur (1999).
32.2 Partisan divides over time
One phenomenon the paper addresses is the partisan divide in Congress—
members of diﬀerent parties vote diﬀerently. Roberts and Smirth (2003) ﬁnd
that since the 100th Congress, Democratic party cohesion was about 75 per-
cent. Republican cohesion reached 90 percent by the 106th Congress.2 Note,
however, that cohesion can arise when members of both parties vote the same
way. A more interesting pattern arises when one party’s support for a policy
induces the other party to oppose it. Fett (1994) indeed ﬁnds that the stronger
was President Carter’s support for a bill, the greater the opposition to it by
congressmen outside his core partisans.3
An additional measure that shows party polarization is developed by The-
riault (2005). He uses the 12,756 roll call votes on the 742 most important
pieces of legislation from 1967 to 2004 to compute a party disparity value; this
value is the absolute diﬀerence between the percentage of Republicans and the
percentage of Democrats who vote the same way on a particular roll call vote.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the measure hovered around 33 percent. By
the congresses in the early 2000s, it had more than doubled.
Sharp diﬀerences between the government and the opposition parties are also
found in France. Wilson and Wiste (1976) analyze 357 roll calls in the National
Assembly between 1958 and 1973. Party cohesion was stronger during the Fifth
Republic than during earlier periods. An examination of the pattern of dissent
in each party suggests that this higher cohesion was based not on ideological
homogeneity, but largely on the importance of governmental-opposition consid-
erations. The emergence of a stable and durable majority led deputies to follow
systematic voting patterns: the majority voting with the government and the
minority against it.
2.3 Politics
Though much academic work considers the behavior of the incumbent, and of
the strategies of two candidates vying for oﬃce, little work considers the losing
candidate’s behavior once he serves as the opposition. Some work, however,
models the eﬀort involved in designing good policies. Caillaud and Tirole (2002)
study intraparty and interparty competition among candidates who can invest
in designing good policy platforms. They show that a party’s gain from adopting
a good platform declines with the probability that the other party adopts a good
platform. In contrast, within a party, agreement by diﬀerent members signals
to the voters in the general elections high quality of the policy platform.
Dellis (2007) shows that a coalition member favoring a reform may nonethe-
less veto it (thus delaying the reform until after the next election) and let his
coalition partners share the blame for the non-adoption. Such “blame-game
2Party cohesion is calculated for each party as the mean absolute value of diﬀerence between
the percentage voting yea and the percentage voting nay.
3But the eﬀect is not universal. President Reagan experienced a positive eﬀect outside his
core opponents.
4politics” can be attractive for three reasons: (1) to make an issue salient in the
next election; (2) to hide a candidate’s stance on an issue, and (3) to enhance
bargaining power during the formation of the next government.
3 Reputational voting
I shall look at two ways voters may behave. First, voters may estimate the
ability of the candidates and prefer the candidate who is likely of higher ability.
In particular, under this view, voters consider the outcome of policy only to
the extent that it aﬀects estimates of a candidate’s ability to evaluate policies.
The other view I shall consider, in section 4 below, is that citizens vote retro-
spectively, with support for the incumbent increasing with the success of his
policies.
I begin with reputational considerations. A rational voter would compare the
estimated ability of the incumbent to the estimated ability of the opposition. For
analytical simplicity, I shall suppose that the ability of the incumbent is known,
and focus on how the behavior of the opposition aﬀects a voter’s estimate of the
opposition’s ability.
3.1 Assumptions
A government must choose between two policies, with one good and the other
bad. The prior probability has each equally likely to be the better policy. With
probability sI the government, or the incumbent, gets perfect information about
which policy is better. The value of sI, is exogenously given and is common
knowledge. I suppose that the incumbent always chooses the policy it believes
is better. One might think that an incumbent who wants to make it diﬃcult
for the opposition to reveal its ability would adopt some other strategy. But we
shall see that in equilibrium the opposition may always oppose the government’s
policy, thereby revealing nothing about the opposition’s ability. The incumbent
would then gain nothing from deviating from a strategy in which he always
chooses the policy he thinks best. Truthful behavior by the incumbent would
thus be consistent with utility-maximizing behavior in an equilibrium.
The ability of the opposition, sO, is either High (sH




O. The value of sO gives the probability that the opposition correctly evaluates
whether the incumbent’s policy is good or bad. The opposition knows its own
ability. In estimating the opposition’s ability, a voter takes into account the
prior probability that the opposition has high ability, the strategy the opposition
will choose in equilibrium, and the outcome of the policy: an opposition which
supported a successful policy will be viewed as having at least as high ability
as an opposition which opposed a successful policy.
The timing of events is as follows
1. Nature determines whether the incumbent will choose correctly.
2. The incumbent chooses the policy he thinks is best.
53. The opposition observes the policy the incumbent chose.
4. Nature determines whether the opposition observes which policy is better.
5. The opposition can either support or oppose the incumbent’s policy. The
public observes that position.
6. The outcome of the policy is realized.
7. The public forms a posterior estimate of the opposition’s ability. The
probability that the opposition wins the forthcoming election increases
with the posterior probability that the opposition has High ability.
3.2 Opposition will not vote sincerely
I shall ﬁrst show that in equilibrium the opposition will not vote sincerely. That
is, the opposition will not always vote for the policy it believes is most likely
to succeed. For suppose that the opposition did. Note that if sO = sL
O < sI,
then the opposition should expect that the policy the incumbent chose is the
better policy. An opposition of low ability should therefore always vote with
the incumbent. But if sH
O > sI, then a high-ability opposition may sometimes
believe that the incumbent chose the wrong policy, and sincere voting would
make it vote against the incumbent. Thus, if the opposition votes sincerely,
then only when the opposition has high ability will the opposition vote against
the incumbent. Voting against the incumbent would then perfectly signal the
opposition’s high ability. The opposition would therefore gain in deviating from
a putative equilibrium with sincere voting, by voting against the incumbent.
Thus, sincere voting cannot be an equilibrium.
3.3 Opposition always opposes the incumbent
But in equilibrium the opposition may always against the incumbent’s proposed
policy. The opposition’s gain from voting with the incumbent depends on the
public’s beliefs about out-of-equilibrium behavior. It is trivial to show that
some beliefs can support an equilibrium with the opposition always opposing
the government—suppose that the public initially believes that an opposition
which votes with the government has low ability.
More interesting is to show that such an equilibrium can be supported by
other than arbitrary beliefs of the public. To that end, here I adopt a weak form
of the Intuitive Criterion.4 Alternatively, the solution can be viewed as arising
from a trembling hand—with positive probability the opposition supports the
policy it estimates is better regardless of how that aﬀects its reputation. In
particular, I shall show that a low-ability opposition has a greater incentive to
deviate from always opposing the incumbent than does a high-ability opposition.
The public may therefore reasonably suppose that a deviation is more likely
made by a low-ability opposition than by a high-ability opposition, and therefore
4The standard Intuitive Criterion is by Cho and Kreps (1987).
6thinks that an opposition which votes with the government is more likely of low
ability than is an opposition which votes against the government.
Suppose the incumbent always proposes whichever policy he thinks is better,
and suppose that sL
O < sI < sH
O. Then a low-ability opposition thinks it more
likely that the incumbent knows which policy is better than that the opposition
itself knows. A low-ability opposition can therefore increase the probability of
choosing correctly by voting with the government than by opposing it. In con-
trast, a high-ability opposition knows that its judgment is more likely correct
than is the incumbent’s; therefore only when the opposition believes that the
incumbent chose correctly would it support the government. Since this event
occurs with probability less than 1, a high-ability opposition is less likely to sup-
port the incumbent than is a low-ability opposition. Supporting the incumbent
is then a signal of low ability, which the opposition will avoid.
Nor can it be a Nash equilibrium for both a high-ability and a low-ability
opposition always to vote with the incumbent—for then a high-ability opposition
could gain from deviating, voting against the incumbent when the opposition
believes that the incumbent was wrong..
But in equilibrium the opposition may always vote against the government’s
proposals. This equilibrium can appear if the public believes, for example, that
an opposition which votes with the incumbent is more likely of low ability than
of high ability. For that belief is consistent with the relative incentives of the two
types of opposition. A low-ability opposition has a greater incentive to vote with
the incumbent—it thereby votes for the right policy with the probability that
the incumbent proposed the right policy. In contrast, a high-ability opposition
which voted with the incumbent would expect to vote for the right policy only
when its information matched the incumbent’s. Thus, a low-ability opposition
would gain more than a high-ability opposition from voting with the incumbent,
and so voting with the incumbent would signal a low-ability opposition.
4 Retrospective voting
4.1 Assumptions
The previous section considered reputation, with voters rationally estimating
the opposition’s ability. Here I take another, though related, approach, exam-
ining retrospective voting—the incumbent is more likely to win re-election if he
adopted a good policy. Voters do not estimate the abilities of the incumbent
or of the opposition, and reputation is irrelevant; the opposition can aﬀect an
election only by aﬀecting policy. This section therefore modiﬁes the assump-
tions, allowing the opposition to aﬀect policy, by giving the opposition a positive
probability of stopping a policy, or by conveying information to the incumbent
about the quality of the policy.
I consider a three-stage process of policymaking— the incumbent proposes
a policy, the opposition can vote against it (thereby perhaps stopping it), and
the incumbent can then decide whether to implement the policy. (We can
7interpret implementation as binary eﬀort. If the incumbent exerts no eﬀort,
then the program is not implemented.) The last stage is important because it
allows the opposition’s behavior to inform the incumbent about the quality of
policy; without such information transmission, the opposition’s strategy would
be trivial—oppose policies that hurt it, and support policies that beneﬁt it.
The non-implementation of a policy is common. Sometimes it occurs under
divided government, where the president refuses to adopt a program a Congress
controlled by the other party had passed; Nixon’s impoundment of funds oﬀers
an important example. But sometimes a president announces a policy which
he later does not implement; we can think of the weak eﬀorts to rebuild New
Orleans after hurricane Katrina. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) oﬀer a classic
description of implementation problems.
The assumptions in this section closely relate to the idea used in the pre-
vious sections in which one policy was allowed to be better than another. A
diﬀerence here is that I allow for a status quo, or a reversion level, if no policy
is implemented.
I suppose the opposition aims to minimize the incumbent’s chances of re-
election. I view the quality of policy from the incumbent’s perspective. A
Good policy increases his chances of re-election; a Bad policy reduces it. The
opposition prefers that a Bad policy is adopted, and that a Good policy is not.
The incumbent correctly evaluates policy with probability sI; the opposi-
tion correctly evaluates policy with probability sO. Let sI and sO be common
knowledge, and let sI ≥ sO. The policy, if enacted and implemented, will give
the incumbent either a gain or a loss; the implemented policy will beneﬁt the
incumbent if the state of nature is favorable (which it is with probability γ) and
will hurt him otherwise. Suppose the incumbent believes the state of nature is
favorable; I say for short that he saw a Good signal. Then an opposition which
also saw a Good signal will veto the bill: because of retrospective voting, the
opposition suﬀers when a Good policy is implemented. The incumbent’s utility
when he implements a Good policy is UG > 0; his utility when he implements a
Bad policy is UB < 0. The incumbent’s utility is 0 if no policy is implemented.
I view this as a zero-sum game, so that the opposition aims to minimize the
incumbent’s expected utility.
The timing of events is as follows
1. Nature determines whether the state of nature is favorable or unfavorable.
2. The incumbent and the opposition each see a signal of the state of nature.
3. An incumbent who believes the state of nature is favorable proposes the
policy.
4. The opposition supports or opposes the incumbent’s policy.
5. The policy is enacted or not, with enactment less likely if the opposition
opposes the policy.
86. If the policy is enacted the incumbent chooses whether to implement it or
not.
7. The outcome of the policy, if implemented, is realized.
8. The utility of the incumbent is realized
Call πGG the probability that the policy is Good given that the incumbent
and the opposition saw a Good signal, let πBG be the probability that policy
is Good given that the incumbent saw a Bad signal and the opposition saw a
signal of Good, and so on.
The incumbent’s signal is correct with probability sI; the opposition’s signal
is correct with probability sO. The probability that the incumbent sees a Good
signal is γsI +(1−γ)(1−sI). The posterior probability that the policy is Good
given that the incumbent saw a Good signal is
πG ≡
γsI
γsI + (1 − γ)(1 − sI)
. (1)
The probability that the policy is Good given that the incumbent saw a Good
signal and the opposition saw a Bad signal is
πGB ≡
γsI(1 − sO)
γsI(1 − sO) + (1 − γ)(1 − sI)(sO)
. (2)
Similar expressions deﬁne πB and πBB.
4.2 Informational value of the opposition’s vote
How can sincere voting by the opposition yield valuable information to the
incumbent? There are several cases to consider. Either the incumbent saw a
Good signal, or else he saw a Bad signal. The opposition can vote only if the
incumbent proposed the policy.
Suppose that πGUG + (1 − πG)UB > 0 but that πGBUG + (1 − πGB)UB <
0. Then an incumbent who knew nothing about the opposition’s signal would
implement the policy; but an incumbent who thought the opposition saw a Bad
signal would not implement the policy.
Suppose next that πGUG+(1−πG)UB < 0 but that πGGUG+(1−πGG)UB >
0. Then the incumbent will switch from not implementing the policy to imple-
menting it if he learns that the opposition saw a Good signal.
Similar analysis applies if the incumbent saw a Bad signal. The incumbent
would learn valuable information from the opposition if πBUG+(1−πB)UB > 0
but πBBUG + (1 − πBB)UB < 0: an incumbent who knew the opposition had
seen a Bad signal would not implement the policy. And the information would
also be valuable if πBUG +(1−πB)UB < 0 but πBGUG +(1−πBG)UB > 0: an
incumbent who learned that the opposition saw a Good signal would implement
the policy.
94.3 Equilibria
4.3.1 Opposition cannot veto policy
Consider ﬁrst the situation where the opposition is powerless to veto or enact
policy; the incumbent enacts and implements whatever policy he desires. The
only possible eﬀect of the opposition’s vote is to inform the incumbent. Since
whatever beneﬁts the opposition hurts the incumbent, in equilibrium the oppo-
sition would not behave in a way which informs the incumbent of the quality of
policy. And if the opposition’s vote aﬀects the incumbent’s decision on imple-
mentation, then the opposition will manipulate its vote to hurt the incumbent.
In equilibrium, therefore, the incumbent ignores the opposition’s vote. The op-
position can do no better than always to oppose the incumbent’s policy, or for
that matter always to support it, or to choose randomly how to vote. No equi-
librium can have the opposition vote sincerely, supporting a policy that hurts
the incumbent and opposing a policy that helps the incumbent.
4.3.2 Opposition can veto policy
Suppose the opposition can veto any policy. Then it is an equilibrium for the
opposition always to veto the incumbent’s proposal. Suppose it does so, and
using the Intuitive Criterion, consider the beliefs of the incumbent for out-of-
equilibrium behavior. Suppose that if the opposition does not veto the policy,
then with some small exogenous probability the policy will be implemented. The
opposition would gain from a policy that hurts the incumbent (what I called a
Bad policy), and the opposition would suﬀer from the implementation of a Good
policy. Therefore, the opposition has greater incentive to veto a Good policy
than to veto a Bad policy. In turn, the incumbent would rationally believe
that a policy that the opposition did not veto is more likely Bad than Good.
That in turn means that the incumbent would not implement a policy that
the opposition had not vetoed. That in turn means, that the opposition loses
nothing by vetoing a Bad policy. Combined with the beneﬁt to the opposition of
vetoing a Good policy, we conclude that it is an equilibrium for the opposition
to veto all policies.
Notice that under retrospective voting an equilibrium cannot have mixed
strategies. For the opposition would veto a policy it thinks is Good. And
therefore a non-veto would inform the incumbent.
4.3.3 Opposition has incomplete veto power
I so far looked at two extreme cases—the opposition is powerless to stop the
enactment of a policy, and the opposition has full power to block enactment of a
policy. We can think of intermediate possibilities, indicated by the probability, v,
that the opposition can block the enactment of a policy the incumbent proposed.
We saw that at the extreme solutions (no veto power and full veto power) an
equilibrium has the opposition always opposing the incumbent’s proposal. We
would expect that the same would hold under intermediate values. Indeed,
10we can think that a coin ﬂip determines whether the opposition can block a
proposal, and that following the coin ﬂip the opposition determines whether
to support or oppose a policy. We are then back to the problem we discussed
above, with the same equilibrium.
When the opposition has veto power, I showed that an equilibrium has the
opposition veto all proposals the incumbent makes. There might exist other
equilibria, but they must have the same payoﬀs as the equilibrium in which the
opposition vetoes all proposals. For notice that the opposition can guarantee
to itself a payoﬀ no worse than zero—it can do so by vetoing all proposals.
Moreover, the incumbent can guarantee to itself a payoﬀ of at least zero—it
can get that by proposing or implementing no policy. Therefore the equilibrium
payoﬀ must be zero—the opposition can ensure that the incumbent gets no more
than zero, and the incumbent can ensure getting at least zero. Therefore, any
equilibrium must have a payoﬀ of zero to the incumbent and to the opposition.
5 Extensions
5.1 Migration
When people can migrate, the opposition will be especially reluctant to point
out bad policies that will hurt its supporters; the opposition may instead pre-
fer to inform the public of the incumbent’s policies that hurt the incumbent’s
supporters. These biases can explain why Republican voters are disenchanted
with Republicans—the Republicans do not protect the interests of Republican
voters. The problem is more severe when migration is possible (as in local gov-
ernment) than when migration is not (as in national government). For related
literature, refer to Brueckner and Glazer (forthcoming) and references therein.
5.2 Timing of opposition
The opposition will be especially reluctant to point out mistakes the incum-
bent made early in the incumbent’s term, because that information would give
the incumbent opportunity to correct the problem before the next election. In
contrast, at the end of the term, the incumbent has little opportunity to take
corrective action, and so the opposition gains from showing that the incum-
bent did bad. Such behavior by the opposition would create a honeymoon
eﬀect. Consistent with this reasoning, empirical work ﬁnds that presidents are
at the height of their congressional inﬂuence in the ﬁrst year of their tenure
(for supporting evidence, see Light (1983, pp. 40-46), and Peterson (1990, pp.
120-122).)
6 Conclusion
In Federalist Number 70 Alexander Hamilton wrote that “Men often oppose a
thing, merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it
11may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been
consulted, and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their
estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves
bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to defeat the
success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of
upright, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking, with
horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried ...”
Hamilton thus described in the eighteenth century the tendency of the oppo-
sition to oppose even good proposals. I showed how this bias need arise not only
from personal failings, but from a rational calculus by vote-seeking politicians.
We should therefore not rely on the opposition to guard against errors made
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158 Notation
sI Probability the incumbent correctly evaluates policy
sO Probability the opposition correctly evaluates policy
p Probability policy succeeds
UG Incumbent’s utility from implementation of Good policy
UB Incumbent’s utility from implementation of Bad policy
πGG Probability policy is Good given that both the opposition and the incum-
bent saw a signal that it is good
πGB Probability policy is Good given that the incumbent saw a signal that it
is Good, and the opposition saw a signal that it is Bad
πi
1 Prior probability that sO = si
O with i = H or L).
γ Prior probability that policy is Good
16